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PRINCIPALS, ACCESSORIES AND THE CONTINUING CRIME
VICTOR E. GRIMM
The legal status of a person entering into a
crime after the crime has been partially completed
is a problem which has not been satisfactorily
resolved by either state courts or legislatures. The
recent Illinois case of People v. Zierliow' serves as
an effective illustration. The case involved a
burglary in which four men broke into a ware-
house office and pushed a safe from the second
floor into the building yard. The burglars found
the safe too heavy for them to remove and left
to obtain assistance. Meanwhile, a company
employee who had observed their activities sum-
moned the police. When the burglars returned
they were accompanied by several other men,
one of whom was the defendant. They attempted
to remove the safe and were apprehended.
The court was thus squarely presented with the
issue of whether the defendant should be classified
as a principal or as an accessory after the fact.
In the trial court the defendant was convicted
on a charge of burglary. Upon appeal the Illinois
Supreme Court reversed the conviction, concluding
that since the elements of the crime of burglary
had been completed when the defendant entered
the crime, he could not be convicted as a principal.
The court adopted the appellant's theory "that
1 16 Ill. 2d 217, 157 N.E.2d 72 (1959).
to warrant a conviction for burglary it must be
shown that the accused entered a building with
intent to commit a felony, and that since the
evidence fails to show such conduct on the part of
the defendant the present conviction cannot
stand."12 Thus, on the basis of the statutory defini-
tion of burglary, the crime was complete when
the defendant joined the perpetrators, and he
therefore could not be convicted as a principal.
The lone dissenter, disagreeing with the
majority's method of determining when a crime
is complete for purposes of principal-accessory
analysis, pointed out:
While we have held that a burglary is complete
upon the breaking and entering with intent to
steal.. .this does not preclude the crime
from being a continuing one as long as the
participants are still in the process of com-
mitting larceny of the property.3
The conclusion expressed in the dissent is that
since the crime was continuing when Zierlion
entered, the appellant, if guilty of any crime, was
guilty as a principal.4 This case presents the
2 id. at 219, 157 N.E.2d at 73 (1959).
3 Id. at 220, 157 N.E.2d at 73 (1959) (dissenting
opinion).
4When cases involving the status of the "late
joiner" arise, courts have difficulty reaching conclusions
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primary issue to be considered-the determination
of the criminal status of the "late joiner."
Parties to a Crime
A brief survey of the classification of parties to
a crime will be helpful in understanding the
problem. At common law parties to a crime were
typically classified either as principals or acces-
sories.5 Further division was traditionally made
in the following manner: principals, in the first or
in the second degree (aiders and abettors); acces-
sories before or after the fact.6
The classification of principals into the first
degree, i.e., "one who is the actual perpetrator of
the criminal act,"7 and the second degree, i.e.,
"those who are present aiding and abetting the
commission of the offense," 8 is primarily of only
historical significance.9 Today aiders and abettors
are regarded by statute as equally guilty with,
and are punished in the same manner as, principals
in the first degree. 10
An accessory before the fact is one who aids
and counsels another in committing a crime but
which appear both just and logical. 1 Wn u.Axs,
CmNAL LAw §55 (1953). In a Canadian case similar
to Zierlion, an opposite result was reached, although
the basis of the court's decision is not clear. The Queen
v. Campbell [1899] Qu6. Q.B. 169, 2 Can. Crim. Cas.
357.
r State v. Rodosta, 173 La. 623, 138 So. 124 (1931).6 However, at common law and under most state
statutes these distinctions are applicable only to
felony cases. State v. Churchill, 105 N.J.L. 123, 143
At. 330 (1928). Thus, accessories are recognized
neither in treason nor misdemeanor cases. Treason
was historically considered so serious that all involved
were subject to the capital penalty. In the case of
misdemeanors, "perpetrators, abettors and inciters are
all principals, because the law 'does not descend to
distinguish the different shades of guilt in petty
misdemeanors.'" The historical justification for
making no distinction in misdemeanor cases seems to
be acceptable, since punishment for misdemeanors is
generally light. This view continues to prevail in the
majority of jurisdictions. Perkins, Parties to Crime, 89
U. PA. L. REv. 581, 586 (1941).
71 WHARTON, CivarNA. LAw §240 (12th ed. 1932).8id. §245; In re Vann, 136 Fla. 113, 186 So. 424
(1939).
9 "A number of old statutes prescribed different
Eunishments for the two classes of offenders. To-day,
owever, these distinctions have been removed."
4 STEPHEN, CoiaMn NT s oN THE LAws or ENGLAND
30 (21st ed. 1950).
10 Red v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. 667, 47 S.W. 1003(1898); People v. Smith, 271 Mich. 553, 260 N.W. 911
(1935). A distinction remains only in rare instances
where a different penalty is stipulated for a principal
in the first degree vis-a-vis a principal in the second
degree. State v. Woodworth, 121 N.J.L. 78, 1 A.2d 254
(1938).
is not present at its commission." Most modem
statutes, however, have abolished this distinction
and equated accessories before the fact with
principals.u
An accessory after the fact, one who with
knowledge aids and assists a principal after com-
mission of the felony, was, by common law,
regarded as tainted by the felon and equally
guilty with him." Present day legislation, however,
has established a lesser punishment for these
individuals, although some states regard the
crime as a misdemeanor and others consider it a
felony.14
The only distinction remaining is that between
principals and accessories after the fact. The
basis for the legal difference between these cate-
gories is reflected in their definitions. The statutory
definition of accessory after the fact assumes
that the crime has been completed, and thus the
accessory's intent was not to commit the principal
crime but merely to aid the principal in his
escape.15 This is clearly a lesser crime, and there-
fore the punishment should be less severe for the
accessory than for the principal. Abolition of this
distinction would result in inequity and unneces-
sary confusion. For, if all persons connected with
a crime were subject to conviction only as princi-
pals, the courts would be faced with the prob-
lem of convicting minor participants of the major
offense or setting them free.
The determination of when the crime is com-
pleted, however, is not always an easy matter.
The Zierlion case suggests an objective approach
to the problem. The court's reasoning implies
that if the defendant entered the crime while it
was "continuing," he is presumed to have intended
n Clayton v. State, 244 Ala. 10, 13 So. 2d 420 (1942).
12 CAL. PENAL CODE §971; I.L. REv. STAT. ch. 38,
§582 (1959); IowA CODE §12895 (1939). For bibli-
ography see WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 7, § 239 n. 1.
The reason for equating the two is that those planning
a crime, though not participating in its commission,
are as culpable as the actual perpetrators. For example,
it is dear that one who organizes and aids in a con-
spiracy but who is not present at its commission should
be punished equally with the perpetrators. Perkins,
supra note 6, at 602.
13 Newborn v. State, 106 Tex. Crim. 354, 292 S.W.
247 (1927); Hightower v. State, 78 Tex. Crim. 606,
182 S.W. 492 (1916).
14 Compare, White v. Commonwealth,. 301 Ky. 228,
191 S.W.2d 244 (1945), with Iiz. REv. STAT. ch. 38,
§584 (1959); see generally Perkins, supra note 6, at 605.
15 The Illinois provision is typical: "He... who
conceals, maintains or assists any principal felon...
knowing him to be such, shall be an accessory after the
fact." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §584 (1959).
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to aid in completing the crime, and he is therefore
a principal. On the other hand, if the defendant
entered after the crime was completed, then he is
assumed to have intended to aid the principal
only in his escape, and thus he is guilty as an
accessory after the fact. Evidence of true intent
would seem to be disregarded as a factor.
In an attempt to examine the validity of this
approach it is necessary, first, to ascertain whether
there are definitive tests which may be utilized
in an attempt to determine when a crime is com-
plete, and, second, whether the intent of the late
joiner should be disregarded.
The Continuing Crime
The typical felony-murder situation also in-
volves the problem of distinguishing between the
completed and the continuing crime and an
analogy may be drawn from solutions there
developed. In this context, if a death is caused
during the commission of a felony, a murder
conviction may be sought.16
Various formulae have been developed by the
courts in an attempt to determine when a crime
is complete for felony-murder purposes. A number
of courts rely on the technical definition of the
crime committed.17 When this approach is used it
becomes important to distinguish between various
crimes, for, by their very definition some crimes
will extend for a longer period of time than others.
For example, the traditional common law defini-
tion of burglary is to break and enter the house
of another at night with intent to commit a felony,
although the felony need not be accomplished.18
Larceny and robbery, however, include a "taking"
of property as a necessary element of the crime. 9
Thus, some courts are prone to regard these
crimes as continuing for a longer period due to
the asportation of the property by the felons.2'
Since this approach is derived from the defini-
tion of the felony involved without regard to the
surrounding circumstances, it may be concluded
that its application need not be limited to the
felony-murder situations. The definition test is
extremely narrow and is the one used by the
16 For a summary of applicable statutes see: Morris,
The Felon's Responsibility for Lethal Acts of Others,
105 U. PA. L. Rzv. 50, 59 (1956).
17 State v. Habig, 106 Ohio St. 151, 140 N.E. 195
(1932); State v. Brown, 7 Ore. 186 (1879).
18 United States v. Brandenburg, 144 F.2d 656, 660
(3rd. Cir. 1944).
"9 People v. Braverman, 340 Ill. 525, 173 N.E. 55
(1930).
20 State v. Adams, 339 Mo. 926, 932, 98 S.W.2d 632,
636-37 (1936).
majority of the court in the Zierlion case to render
the late joiner in the crime an accessory after the
fact. An appropriate criticism of this strict view
was presented by the California court in People v.
Boss,21 where it was pointed out that the definition
of burglary "was adopted to make punishment
of this class of crime more certain. It was not
intended to relieve the wrongdoer from any prob-
able consequences of his act by placing a limitation
upon the res gestae which is unreasonable or
unnatural."
The preceding statement recognizes the second
formula, the res gestae test, which is accepted by
many courts." The term is borrowed from the
law of evidence and refers to "circumstances and
declarations.. .contemporaneous with the com-
mission of the crime and so connected with it
as to illustrate its character."' ' The res gestae
test furnishes a flexible approach for determin-
ing when a crime is completed. Indeed, this
test may be so flexible as to offer no more
than a restatement of the problem, for it is not
illuminating to submit that anything which is
part of the res gestae is part of the crime. Never-
theless, it appears that a majority of the courts
adopt the res gestae approach, at least as a part
of their determinative standard, possibly because
the approach does lend itself to flexible applica-
tion.24 On the other hand, when a court uses res
gestae language, it may be that the determination
has already been made through use of one of the
other formulae, and thus the court is simply
pointing out that since the crime is continuing,
the activities under consideration are part of the
res gestae.s"
The res gestae theory was developed as a result
of considering each crime in its natural circum-
21210 Cal. 245, 250, 290 Pac. 881, 884 (1930).
2E.g., State v. Daniels, 119 Wash. 557, 205 Pac.
1054 (1922); State v. Hershon, 329 Mo. 469, 45 S.W.2d
60 (1931).
23 People v. Jarvis, 306 Ill. 611, 614, 138 N.E. 102,
103 (1923).
2A For a collection of these cases see: 108 A.L.R. 847(1937); 22 A.L.R. 850 (1923).
25 Although some courts do undoubtedly use the res
gestae theory as the sole formula, other courts use the
term to describe the result of their inquiry. This is
indicated by the language of the court in People v.
Boss, 210 Cal. 245, 290 Pac. 881, 883 (1930):
Without revolvers to terrify, or, if occasion re-
quires, to kill any person who attempts to appre-
hend them at the time of, or immediately upon
gaining possession of said property, their plan
would be childlike. The defense of felonious
possession which is challenged immediately
upon the forcible taking is a part of the plan
of robbery, or, as the books express it, it is res
gestae of the crime.
[Vol. 51
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stances. This test, then, is not peculiar to felony-
murder situations for which it was developed,
but its application to all crimes should be equally
valid. Indeed, the State, in People v. Zierlion,
advanced the res gestae argument as adopted
from the law of evidence but made no reference
to its use in the felony-murder cases in which
context it is generally thought to assume broader
proportions.25 Therefore, its employment in the
Zierlion case would probably have resulted in a
determination that the crime was not terminated
when the defendant entered since the participants
were still involved in the "perpetration of the
crime."21
A conspiracy analysis is the third test used for
determining when a crime is completed in felony-
murder situations. The primary inquiry is in
relation to the activities which the conspirators
included in their plans. A conspiracy to commit
robbery, for example, naturally includes plans
for escape with the stolen property. Within reason-
able limits, therefore, the crime continues until
the escape is successful.ss The conspiracy test
undoubtedly will produce the same result as the
res gestae test in many cases, and, in fact, the two
tests are often combined.n The conspiracy test,
as the res gestake test, is not peculiarly applicable
to felony-murder situations but is amenable to
broader applications. A prior Illinois felony-
murder cas& adopted the "conspiracy to rob and
escape" formula which suggests that this approach
26 The determination of what constitutes a 'con-
tinuous act' must, of course, depend upon the
evidence in each case, but once it is considered
established, the rule [is] somewhat similar to
that formulated in cases adopting the theory of
'res gestae'.. . . This does not mean that the
homicide must occur within the technical limits
of what would ordinarily be considered 'res
gestae' as to time, but must form a substantial
part of the 'perpetration' of the felony with
regard to the rules of cause and effect and the
'unities of time, manner and place' .... 108
A.L.R. 850-51 (1936).
27 A Missouri case involving a burglary and a homi-
cide during the escape was decided on the ground that
the jury could have found that the defendant fired the
fatal shot, but by way of dictum the court pointed out:
It is held in many jurisdictions, including
Missouri, that when the homicide is within the
res geskie of the initial crime and is an emanation
thereof, it is committed in the perpetration
of that crime in the statutory sense. State v.
Adams, 339 Mo. 926, 933, 98 S.W.2d 632, 637
(1936).
2 State v. Messino, 325 Mo. 743, 30 S.W.2d 750
(1930).29 Iid.
3"People v. Bongiorno, 358 Ill. 171, 192 N.E. 856
(1934).
could have been used in the Zierlion case. The
analogy, however, was not presented to the
Zierlion court, and whether the court would have
accepted it is mere speculation. It does appear,
however, that such an application would have
been valid and would have caused the defendant
to be regarded as a principal.
As might be expected, most courts adopt com-
binations and variations of these formulae,31 and
it is often difficult to determine which factors are
controlling. The conspiracy approach, however,
seems to be the most logical solution to the
problem. The circumstances involved in each case
may be considered without the necessity of sacri-
ficing fairly definitive standards. The only inquiry
is in relation to the activities involved in the
original plans for commission of the crime. Thus,
the restrictiveness of the definition test and the
ambiguity of the res geskie test are eliminated.
justice Davis, dissenting in People v. Zierlian,
adopted the theory that the crime was continuing
and that, if guilty of any crime, the defendant
should be convicted as a principal." The difficulties
encountered here, however, are aggravated by
the question of whether the activities engaged in
by the defendant with intent to aid in the crime
were sufficient to constitute him a principal even
though committed while the crime was continuing.
An examination of the elements of a principal in
the second degree is essential in reaching a con-
clusion in relation to the minimum activity re-
quired to regard a late joiner as a participant.-
A guilty first degree principal, presence (actual
or constructive) and participation are necessary
requisites in constituting one a principal in the
second degree.n
The first of these elements is indisputably
present in the Zierlion case. The principals in the
first degree were indicted and convicted on the
charge of burglary. However, the second element
31 Brady v. Maryland, 154 A.2d 434 (Md. 1959).
' See supra note 3.
3 The reader will recall that it was earlier pointed
out that the distinction between principals in the first
and in the second degree (aiders and abettors) has
largely been abolished. Nevertheless, the classification
of a criminal as a principal, though not the actual
perpetrator, necessitates an inquiry into the elements
of the common law aider and abettor. This approach
is required since most of the statutes involved simply
declare an abrogation of the distinction. The Illinois
statute is representative:
An accessory is he who stands by, and aids,
abets or assists.... He who thus aids, abets,
assists, advises or encourages, shall be con-
sidered as a principal, and punished accordingly.
IL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §582 (1959).
4CLAriK & MAnsnArL, CRa~ms §8.02 (6th ed. 1958).
19601
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-presence during the commission of the offense
-presents some difficulty. The defendant was
present during a portion of the crime but was
neither present nor aware of the commission of
the major part thereof. However, it has been held
that actual physical presence during the crime
is not essential, the classic example being the
lookout in a robbery or burglary.35 The theory of
this doctrine is, of course, that the absent party
is aware of, and approves, the activities of his
accomplices. Thus, the difficulties of application
of this hypothesis are compounded by the require-
ment of knowledge and approval of the principals'
activities. The dissent in the Zierlion case
intimated that this problem may be circumvented
through use of a legal fiction of ratification of all
of the prior acts which the aider's cohorts had
committed in perpetration of the crime. This is
supported by an analogy drawn from the legal
principle that one may withdraw from a criminal
activity and thereby purge himself of guilt for
subsequent acts of the perpetrators.3 6 "Con-
versely," the dissent points out, "one who joins
and participates in completing a criminal enter-
prise should be responsible for both the prior and
subsequent acts committed in furtherance of such
venture."3' This is a compelling argument when
it is realized that the party joining the crime is
aware of what has taken place and unites to com-
plete the crime successfully.
The third element, that of participation in the
crime, is at least partially satisfied by the aid
rendered in attempting to secure the stolen goods.
Although there was no tangible participation in
the technical burglary, it has often been held that
such physical participation is unnecessary.u Thus,
on this basis, the dissent in the Zierlian case
35 Schmid v. State, 77 Ga. App. 623, 49 S.E.2d 134
(1948); People v. Arnett, 408 Ill. 164, 96 N.E.2d 535
(1951).
36 State v. Klein, 97 Conn. 321, 116 Atl. 596 (1922);
State v. Peterson, 213 Minn. 56, 4 N.W.2d 826 (1942).
- People v. Zierlion, 16 Ill. 2d 217, 222-23, 157
N.E.2d 72, 75 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
's People v. Blackwood, 35 Cal. App. 2d 728, 96
P.2d 982 (1939); Warden v. State, 24 Ohio St. 143
(1873).
Perkins, supra note 6, at 597 points out:
Counsel, command or encouragement may be in
the form of words or gestures. Such a purpose
'may be manifested by acts, words, signs,
motions, or any contact which unmistakably
evinces a design to encourage, incite, or approve
of the crime.' Promises or threats are very
effective for this purpose, but much less will
meet the legal requirement, as where a bystander
merely emboldened the perpetrator to kill the
deceased.
concludes that the defendant was a principal in
the major crime of burglary.
The Subjective Approach
As previously indicated, an application of the
res gestae and conspiracy formulae to the Zierlion
case would extend the burglary at least to the
point of escaping with the loot, thereby causing
the defendant to be regarded, if a criminal at all,
as a principal. Although an application of either
of these formulae may produce the same result,
depending upon the jurisdiction, the objections
to the res gestae test should be kept in mind. It
may, therefore, be logically concluded that the
crime was continuing to the point at which the
defendant entered into it, and thus he is removed
from the category of accessory after the fact. As
has been pointed out, the Zierlion approach
presumes at this point that the requisite intent to
aid the crime is also present.
An opposite extreme would be a complete
reliance on a subjective or intent analysis. An
application of the intent approach to the Zierlioz
case would appear to render the defendant a
principal since he apparently intended to aid in
rendering the principal crime a success. However,
should the late joiner's sole purpose be to aid the
perpetrator in escaping, a different result might
occur. Nevertheless, it would undoubtedly be
difficult, if not impossible, for Zierlion to prove
that he did not intend to commit larceny of the
stolen property which he was aiding in trans-
porting.
This analysis, however, breaks down when
applied to a case in which the major crime is
complete and the late joiner enters with the
thought that the crime is not consummated and
intends its completion. In such a situation it would
seem that intent is not enough to constitute one
a principal, for it is well settled that there must
be some actual participation in the major crime.39
Proposed Solution
What then should be the significance of the
aider's intent in a continuing crime situation?
An analysis of another case may afford some aid
in obtaining an answer. In Baker v. State," the
deceased, during the course of an argument, was
attacked and struck with a fire poker. While the
attacker fled, the defendant hid the body of the
3' Smith v. State, 41 Ohio App. 64, 179 N.E. 696
(1931).
40 184 Tenn. 503, 201 S.W.2d 667 (1947).
[Vol. 51
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decedent, who, at that point, was still alive. The
sheriff arrived in a few moments and located the
body, but the victim died a number of days later.
An indictment for murder in the first degree was
brought against the perpetrator. He was convicted
of voluntary manslaughter and did not appeal.
The defendant was indicted and convicted as an
accessory after the fact of voluntary manslaughter.
Upon appeal the conviction was reversed. The
Tennessee Code definition of accessory, a codifica-
tion of the common law, required that the felony
be completed. The court was supported by ample
authority4' in reaching the conclusion that:
the offense of the voluntary manslaughter of
Staggs was not consummated until the death
of Staggs 11 days after the combat had ended,
this death also being 11 days after the acts
for which plaintiff-in-error, Baker is indicted
as an accessory after the fact.A
The court, in determining that the crime of
homicide was incomplete, applied the technical
definition test, as used in the Zierli n case, and
thus concluded that the defendant could not be
an accessory after the fact. Application of the
definition test to the Zierlion case was unduly
restrictive, while application in the Baker case
appears unduly liberal since the crime may be
regarded as continuing for a period as long as a
year and a day."
41 Chapman v. People, 39 Mich. 357 (1878); Harrel
v. State, 39 Miss. 702 (1861). The conclusion has also
been supported by more recent authority. State v.
Williams, 229 N.C. 348,49 S.E.2d 617 (1948); Common-
wealth v. Tilley, 327 Mass. 540, 99 N.E.2d 749 (1951).42fBaker v. State, 184 Tenn. 503, 507, 201 S.W.2d
667, 668 (1947).4 It has also been suggested that the consummation
of the crime would relate back to the original element.
Thus, a person rendering assistance in a murder after
the fatal blow has been struck, but before death, may
be indicted as an accessory after the fact of murder on
the assumption that the victim's death relates back to
the blow. However, such a legal fiction seems to be
generally rejected in relation to murder. In United
States v. M'Gill, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 426,429 (1806), the court
was presented with a similar problem. There, a mortal
blow was struck by the defendant while at sea. The
victim, however, died in a foreign country. If juris-
diction was to be gained, the court had to find that the
death of the victim related back to the time when the
blow was struck. The court refused jurisdiction since,
"murder consists in both the stroke and the consequent
death, both parts of the crime must happen on the
high seas, to give jurisdiction.. . ." Comment, 1
Viw. L. R.v. 127 (1948); State v. Hartigan, 32 Vt.
607 (1860).
44 "A year and a day" is the traditional common law
and statutory limitation requiring death of the victim
within the said length of time after the mortal blow in
order to justify a conviction for murder or man-
slaughter. Thomas, Homiide--Permigsible Duration of
Time Between Inzjury and Death, 25 J. Cn..t L. C. &
An application of the res gestae theory would
also support the conclusion that Baker acted before
the crime was completed since the perpetrator
was making his escape, and only a few moments
had passed since the blow was struck. However,
the res gestae test would not extend the duration
of the crime for as substantial a period of time
as would the definition approach.
The conspiracy formula seems to present in-
superable difficulties when applied to the Baker
case. A criminal conspiracy assumes that one or
more persons are involved in planning the crime.45
Here, the criminal attack was performed by a
single individual. Even if, for purposes of this
case, the test was based upon prior plans of the
individual rather than conspiracy, another problem
would preclude use of the test. The crime of which
the attacker was convicted was voluntary man-
slaughter, a crime requiring no malice aforethought
and therefore no prior planning.
In any event, whatever the outer limitations
of the crime may be, application of both
the broadest and narrowest objective tests to the
Baker case seem to indicate that the defendant's
activities were performed before the crime was
completed. Thus, through objective analysis the
defendant could have been considered a principal;
and intent to commit the major crime may be
implied, therby disregarding actual intent.
It seems inequitable to rely completely on the
objective tests and thus penalize the late joiner
for the passage of a few crucial moments which
may represent the difference between a continuing
and a completed crime. Baker, for example, ap-
parently entered into the criminal activity not
with the intent to aid the killer in successfully
achieving his goal of destroying a life, but rather
for the purpose of aiding the perpetrator to escape.
It appears, therefore, that in order to be con-
sidered guilty as a principal in a continuing crime
situation the late joiner must enter before the
crime is complete and with the intent to aid in
the successful consummation of the crime. How-
ever, when intent cannot be proven, an objective
test should be used, and, when its application
renders the crime continuing, a presumption should
be raised that the late joiner is a principal. This
presumption should be rebuttable by a showing
of intent to aid the criminal in escape rather than
to aid in successfully consummating the crime.
P. S. 632 (1934). Some states allow an even longer
period of time. People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 191
N.E. 850 (1934).
46 Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197 (1893).
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